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Abstract 
Ethnic diversity has historically created conflict in many nation-states throughout the 
globe. From the era of nation-state formation to the present, states have had various strategies for 
dealing with this diversity. These strategies can be divided into three distinct categories: 
assimilation, integration and pluralism. Because of the increasing strength and importance of the 
global indigenous peoples' movement, relations between states and indigenous peoples are 
transforming away from assimilationist models toward integration and symbolic support. Why 
would governments nominally or symbolically support programs to preserve and revive 
indigenous culture? To answer this question, I compare government support for intercultural- 
bilingual education programs in Peru and Guatemala. I find that both states have reached a state 
of institutional paralysis in their implementation of intercultural-bilingual education. A 
comparative historical overview of both countries finds that internal conflicts were turning points 
in the states' relationships with their indigenous peoples. Contention between the government 
and its populations resulted in transformation, either through co-optation or negotiation. Despite 
these distinct trajectories of change, both countries experience institutional paralysis when it 
comes to multicultural policy as a result of states' efforts to maintain their authority through law, 
in accordance with the bureaucratic nature of nation-states. 
State strategies to address issues of ethnic diversity can be divided into three general 
categories: assimilation, integration, and pluralism (Raxchd 1996). Integration and assimilation 
attempt to incorporate different peoples into a national identity, disregarding the diversity of 
cultures present within a country. Though both integration and assimilation reach the same goal, 
assimilation involves coercion and force where integration features more subtle methods. 
Integration feigns respect of the culture of a people while maintaining the same goal of their 
assimilation into dominant society. Cultural diversity is acknowledged and even supported, but 
the driving motivation is still to incorporate the non-dominant group into a pre-existing national 
identity. Pluralism - paralleling indigenous peoples' goals of self-determination - presupposes a 
value for and appreciation of the diversity of a state by its people as well as its government, and a 
desire to incorporate this diversity into the national identity. In the past, states have generally 
attempted to assimilate indigenous peoples into the national identity, all but wiping out the 
culture with which they identifl. In the last twenty years, however, a shift from assimilation to 
integration can be observed in many countries. How can this shift from assimilation to symbolic 
support or integration be explained? 
An examination of language policy helps understand this shift. Due to its importance both 
to indigenous movements and to states, language is a particularly insightful policy area to study. 
Language can unify indigenous peoples - as a marginalized group whose language is not the 
state's official language - and serve to build the nation-state by creating community (Anderson 
1983). The Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (DRIP), approved by the United 
Nations in 2007, provides for indigenous peoples' right to language preservation, indicating its 
importance on an international level (DRIP 2007, Articles 13 and 14). Since state-mandated 
education significantly affects language acquisition and use, this paper explores states' shifts to 
intercultural-bilingual education programs in greater depth. Despite governments' proclamations 
of the importance of intercultural-bilingual education, these programs lack the resources to be 
truly effective. This "implementation gap" is puzzling, since states could cite a variety of reasons 
(such as cost and impracticality) for not advancing these programs. Because of the highly 
symbolic importance of a common language to the state, we might expect either no change at all 
or a major change from the state, but instead we see an intermediate shift to symbolic support. 
What social processes have brought about this shift to symbolic support of intercultural-bilingual 
education programs, instead of no support or full support? 
Since we can see these types of shifts occurring in multiple countries, analysis should 
account for the range of potential influences on policy change. Scholarly work on 
multiculturalism in practice offers helpful insight about the internal dynamics that could result in 
policy change; however, other factors outside of the state may also influence policy. 
Perspectives on nation-state formation are useful for determining what forces, inside and outside 
the state, may factor into state actions. Accordingly, I draw on competing theories of nation-state 
formation to inform potential explanations for changes that could result in pressures that change 
state-indigenous relations. Since its rise in the 1 9 ' ~  century, the nation-state has become the 
dominant form of political, social, economic and cultural organization (Tilly 1990). Due to its 
prevalence, sociologists have advanced knowledge of how nation-states formed and came to be 
such a dominant form of organization (Tilly 1990; Giddens 1984; Mann 1984). Additionally, 
sociological studies explain how boundaries, an important part of nation-state development, are 
altered through war and revolution (Hironaka 2005; Skocpol 1979). Further, studies point to the 
significance of identity formation in the process of nation building. In light of these studies, we 
know much about nation-state formation, but less about how these nation-states internally 
transform after their initial creation. 
Examining ethnic diversity within countries promises to extend knowledge about 
processes affecting nation-states. State-indigenous relations provide a unique vantage point for 
how states internally transform since these relations do not come about due to regime collapse. 
Rather, the global indigenous peoples movement has sought to renegotiate state-indigenous 
relations through legal means (Anaya 2004). Considering the proliferation of law as an 
organizing principle of the nation-state in global culture (Boyle and Meyer 1998) studying 
nation-state transformations in the context of law is particularly important. Additionally, that 
indigenous peoples' main claim to identity is due to their prior inhabitation of the land compared 
to the dominant culture of the nation-state makes their claims to separate identity legitimate in 
the international sphere, but also of interest to theoretical debates (Niezen 2003). Finally, the 
importance of boundaries to the formation of nation-states, and the indigenous peoples' location 
within these contemporary boundaries, makes their claims of distinct identity a particularly 
interesting case to examine in relation to the project of nation-state identity formation. 
To answer the research questions about the change in state-indigenous relations and the 
symbolic support of intercultural-bilingual education programs, I compare two Latin American 
countries. Programs to preserve Quechua languages in Peru and Mayan languages in Guatemala 
have reached a point of stagnation; however, despite their similar outcomes, their origins pose an 
empirical puzzle. While both governments nominally support the programs, they provide no 
resources for their successful implementation. Additionally, programs generally end after the 
third year of primary school, after which Spanish becomes the language of education, 
contributing to castellanizaci6n, integrating indigenous children into Spanish-speaking society. 
Despite a difference in the strength and organization of indigenous movements in both countries, 
the sheer number of Quechua (20-40% of the population) and Maya people (50-60%) in each 
country makes their language preservation an important issue. In Guatemala an organized 
indigenous movement resulted in institutional paralysis, while in Peru a less-organized and 
smaller movement achieved the same outcome. Through what processes have both countries 
reached this same institutional paralysis despite different internal pathways to reform? 
I explore these two interrelated questions - the general shift from assimilation to 
symbolic support and the institutional paralysis in Peru and Guatemala - through comparative- 
historical research as well as analysis of archival and interview data. The comparative-historical 
research explains the timing and reasons for the shift in state-indigenous relations, while the 
interview data describes the institutional paralysis as a result of the shift. Internal conflicts 
experienced by both countries in the second half of the 2oth century provided the impetus to shift 
the states' dealings with indigenous peoples. In Peru, the government co-opted indigenous self- 
organization to resist rebel forces, while in Guatemala the government came to see negotiation 
with indigenous peoples as a more effective means to promote counter-insurgency efforts. In 
both instances, the participation of marginalized and international groups, not just the 
government, were crucial to the changes, implying that the process was not merely a top-down 
restructuring, but a dynamic, contentious process involving multiple parties. Despite the 
difference between the cases and the potential for contingency in the process, the legacy of state 
formation, which historically advocates the creation of homogenous national identity, means the 
support of realistic multicultural policies may be a disadvantage to states seeking to maintain 
their bureaucratic authority. This bureaucratic nature of the state may make far-reaching change 
difficult because it allows for the implementation gap. While the discourse may shift toward a 
more pluralistic stance, bureaucracy permits poor implementation, stagnating progress. 
In this paper, I will first review previous sociological work that explains nation-state 
formation. By describing how states initially rose to power, these theories may help explain how 
states maintain that power. Additionally, I review models of multiculturalism in nation-states to 
understand how some states deal with ethnic diversity; these theories elucidate possible state 
motivations for promoting multiculturalism. My findings detail the circumstances of the internal 
conflicts which led to the transformation in state-indigenous relations, and then, through analysis 
of archival and interview data, describe the results of the shifts in each country. I find a process 
of contention, leading to negotiation or co-optation, and eventually stagnation. In each case we 
see a gap between the declarations of desire and the declarations of reality. States have been able 
to shift to a discourse of tolerance and pluralism, but bureaucracy allows for institutional 
paralysis, making progress slow, if there is progress at all. 
Theoretical Perspectives 
Sociological explanations of nation-state formation often suggest that a single unified 
identity reflects a strong nation-state (Tilly 1990; Gellner 2000) In the contemporary era, 
however, ethnic division, immigration, and other forms of cultural pluralism seem to challenge 
these accounts (Soysal 2000; Bloemraad et a1 2008; Dahlin and Hironaka 2008). Examining 
contemporary transformations in state-indigenous relations contributes to two theoretical 
debates. First, debates about how nation-states formed remain central to comparative-historical 
and political sociology. Applying these theories to state-indigenous relations highlights more 
recent shifts and enduring processes of nation-state operations. Second, a variety of perspectives 
on understanding multiculturalism in practice continue to animate scholarly disagreements and 
offer further explanations to describe the shifts that are taking place. Scholars suggest that 
societies will have to come to value "deep-diversity" in order to be truly multicultural (Kymlicka 
1998). Examining how states actually transform promises into law helps us understand the 
particular forms multiculturalism takes and the processes through which it emerges. Since states 
rely on bureaucratic authority, they adjust the way they operate through the creation and 
implementation of new law. To gain support in times of unrest, states may alter laws to 
incorporate more of their population into the dominant political and social spheres. 
Formation of States and National Identity 
Accounts of how nation-states formed and how they became the most common model for 
political and economic identity provide a foundation to explain the dynamics of state-indigenous 
relations. The four theories I summarize in this section offer predictions for the possibilities for 
why these relations could change, based on strategies and processes of initial nation-state 
formation. Although these theories focus on nation-state formation, they provide some guidance 
about what happens to national identity within a state after it has been established. Social conflict 
and difference within a nation-state might serve as the basis for long-standing claims or 
grievances; however, the critical questions are how changes to state-citizen relations and related 
ideas of national identity arise and what the effects of such changes are. The cultural community 
theory explains the importance of language and education to maintaining and transmitting 
national identity; bellicose and historical-institutional theories suggest that contention generally 
and war, in particular, might result in changes to the relation between a state and its populace; 
and world polity theory suggests emerging international norms might result in changes within 
nation-states. 
Cultural Community Theory This theory suggests that a strong cultural community, 
commonly observed through language, is the string holding together a nation-state. Benedict 
Anderson describes how language helped to form states during the nationalist movements in 
Europe during the isth and 19th centuries. He describes states as "imagined communities" in 
which community is formed among large groups of people because of certain commonalities, 
including language (Anderson 1983). The formation of nation-states began with the breakdown 
of the greater religious communities - to which he traces the foundation of cultural communities 
- and the proliferation of the vernacular. This perspective would predict that the weakening of the 
basis of these imagined communities by the ethnic diversity of an integrated group would change 
the community imagined by the state. The revival of indigenous languages would then challenge 
the imagined cultural community, causing different languages to compete, breaking down the 
cultural link holding the community together and threatening the authority of the state. By 
standardizing education, and in particular the language of education, states could combat this 
threat. 
Bellicose Authority Theory This theory suggests governments deliberately and violently 
homogenized the populace in order to maintain authority so that states would remain militarily 
strong against external challenges. Charles Tilly suggests that such a homogenization was 
probably strategic on the parts of the governments of the European countries that became 
successful nation-states in the 1 9 ~ ~  century. The nation-state was achieved through 
homogenization, making such states more powerful than rival states. Culture depended on the 
state in which one lived more than ever before, while states had an interest in homogenizing 
populations' language and education to build loyalty to the central government's activities (Tilly 
1990: 115-1 16). This model would suggest that a shift could take place if the power of authority 
weakened due to an outside threat, requiring bargaining by the state. The proliferation and 
increased power of indigenous movements throughout the world might threaten government 
authority, causing states to compromise in order to maintain their political authority over all 
citizens in the face of external threats. 
Historical Institutionalist While this perspective shares with the bellicose theory an 
emphasis on political contention as an important causal element, it places greater emphasis on 
localized influences (Wimrner and Feinstein 2010). While Wimmer and Feinstein conclude that 
wars fought within a territory or empire create a political opportunity structure for nationalists to 
promote nation-state formation, they also describe a contagion effect as influencing the spread of 
the nation-state. Bordering nation-states act as models for yet-to-be-formed states, establishing 
the possibility of change for the region. Thus, rather than being external threats, neighboring 
states offer blueprints for dealing with internal challenges to state authority. This model would 
suggest that shifts in state-indigenous relations occur when regimes are weak and when 
neighboring countries have experienced similar changes. 
World Cultural Models This model presumes states conform to emergent international 
norms. John W. Meyer points out that international trends have an increasingly important 
influence over policies enacted by governments throughout the world (Meyer 2004: 42). Though 
their official conformity may turn out to be hypocritical, states do want to appear as though they 
are following global norms. States want to look like they are trying to be like good liberal 
democracies, even if in reality they are not following through on their word. Law fits into this 
picture as a way to manifest the conformity. "Individuals derive their identities and interests 
from some perceived natural order and create legal systems to reflect these higher 'platonic 
ideals"' (Boyle and Meyer 1998: 21 3). Since international law has no real jurisdiction in the way 
that national law does, the conformity of national legal systems becomes a way for international 
law to become standardized on a national level. This model would predict a change in state 
practices when practices that are considered to be legitimate on a global scale change. This 
model differs in source and scale of change from the regional focus of Wirnmer and Feinstein's 
historical institutionalist model. A possible shift in world culture can be observed with the 
growth of the transnational indigenous peoples movement and the increased implementation of 
law to comply with the movement's demands. 
Each of the theories of state formation predicts different sources of change in national 
identity. Cultural community theory would predict that a change in the underlying state-populace 
relation would result in changes in language and education policies. Bellicose theories would 
anticipate that states able to secure support by granting concessions would be stronger in the face 
of external conflict. Historical-institutional theories would predict regional and local change 
influences domestic change. Finally, world polity theory would anticipate decoupling, as state 
changes might reflect global pressures rather than domestic influences. 
Models of State-Indigenous Multiculturalism 
While theories of state formation offer possible explanations for why state-indigenous 
relations might change, theories of how states respond to indigenous multiculturalism provide a 
possible starting point for understanding how shifts in state-indigenous relations are 
implemented. These models generally observe multiculturalism from the top-down perspective, 
looking at how states adjust to the increased volume of the voice of subordinated social groups. 
This one-sided perspective does not account for the ways that indigenous groups also adjust and 
compromise according to state action. Keeping this in mind, in conjunction with nation-state 
formation models, it may be possible to gather ideas about how states transform through the 
years, due to evolving internal dynamics. 
Some scholars examine the effects of multicultural policies from a critical perspective, 
noting the political nature and power dynamics of multiculturalism. Wendy Brown argues that 
multiculturalism as a form of tolerance separates and marginalizes minorities by marking them 
"as deviant, marginal or undesirable by virtue of being tolerated" while elevating the status of 
those who tolerate to a position of superiority (Brown 2006: 14). Behind the moral justifications 
of tolerance politics, there is a deeper political motivation to regulate and control, leading some 
scholars to conclude that multiculturalism requires tyranny to enforce both a single state and 
distinct identities between many people (Walzer 1980: 6). If these perspectives are correct, 
states' moves to establish indigenous intercultural-bilingual education merely mask existing 
power relations and continue the marginalization of indigenous people by dominant state actors. 
This perspective, however, anticipates that multiculturalism is fully implemented, rather than 
explaining why there would be an implementation gap. Additionally, this perspective predicts 
that states would originate efforts at promoting intercultural-bilingual education in order to stay 
and control any possible indigenous movements. 
Scholars studying state-indigenous relations have noted that states in the contemporary 
era may benefit from promoting an international image that incorporates one or more indigenous 
populations. Due to the importance of tourism in this rapidly globalizing world, creating an 
exotic national identity through selective multicultural policy would bring favorable national 
attention (Tilley 2002). Li notes that states with such a motivation seek only to promote those 
people that fit into the "tribal slot." That is, indigenous people that conform to standard scripts of 
what indigenous people look and act like are encouraged to maintain some cultural 
distinctiveness, but only "of the song and dance variety" for external audiences (Li 2000: 154). 
This perspective observes a multicultural policy limited to the cultural sphere in order to create 
an identity which would be favorable to the international audience. It does not, however, account 
for what benefits there might be for indigenous groups to an at least limited support of 
multiculturalism. Though it may only be support of those superficial elements of culture, it 
accounts for a starting point that could lead to greater multiculturalism. Lightfoot describes states 
that have been "overcompliant": states that have not actually ratified documents like ILO 
Convention 169 or the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, but express this desire to 
reinvent a national identity, one that includes the indigenous identity (Lightfoot 2008). There 
may be a variety of interests coming into play here - material, cultural, political - but 
nevertheless this desire to incorporate the indigenous identity into the national identity causes 
increased support for multiculturalism. 
While these models of multiculturalism usefully consider pressures that could influence 
state shifts in policy, they are problematic in that they only view multiculturalism as a top-down, 
state-led process, rather than as an interactive process. They only take into account the state's 
interest in fostering multiculturalism, rather than understanding how shifting state-indigenous 
relations may result from contentious processes in which states have to make concessions or 
surrender some authority to indigenous peoples. From the perspective of bellicose and historical 
institutionalist theories, we would expect policy changes to take place as a result of a process of 
adaptation of multiple parties - state leaders, indigenous peoples, and professionals - reacting to 
new models of relations. From this perspective, the compromise and negotiation that may take 
place when states feel threatened, either internally or externally, could have led to symbolic 
multiculturalism as a way to appease international, as well as domestic demands. 
Methods 
To assess the competing explanations about how state-indigenous relations transform and 
the effects of these transformations on policies, I use a comparative, mixed method approach. 
Comparative-historical analysis of the internal conflicts in Peru and Guatemala uncovers the 
processes of a shift from assimilation to symbolic support for multicultural policy, as well as 
explains the timing of these shifts. Archival documentation and interviews provide evidence 
about the implementation of language policy. 
To establish the institutional paralysis and explore how individual actors perceive the 
implementation of intercultural-bilingual education policy, I use interviews that I conducted in 
Peru and Guatemala, as well as historical and archival evidence. The eight interviews - 
conducted with government officials, educators, and indigenous activists - provide context and a 
human perspective for the first part of my research. The interviews not only establish the 
outcomes of a nominal support of education policy, but they offer insight into how different 
actors with different goals implement new policy in light of new models of state-indigenous 
relations, as well as how these different actors perceive the shift and the new policy as a result of 
this shift. The historical evidence points to a shift in policy in conjunction with the shift in state- 
indigenous relations, as explained with the comparative-historical analysis. The archival 
evidence provides an international perspective, showing how the institutional paralysis is 
perceived by an international audience, like the United Nations, and what steps are being taken 
to improve implementation as a result of the transformation to symbolic support and institutional 
paralysis. 
Peru and Guatemala provide ample ground for comparative analysis of state-indigenous 
relations and implementation of intercultural-bilingual education. Both Peru and Guatemala have 
large populations of indigenous peoples that trace their origins to pre-Columbian empires. 50- 
60% of the Guatemalan population is indigenous (Fischer 1996: 9) and the most commonly 
spoken Mayan language, of the 22 different dialects spoken in Guatemala, has around 1 million 
speakers (Warren 1998: 13). In Peru, 20%-40% of the population identifies as indigenous (Puerta 
Pefia 2008: 1) and an estimated 8.5 to 11 million people throughout South America speak a range 
of Quechua dialects (Encyclopedia of World Cultures 1996: 285-286). Quechua and Mayan 
languages are the two most widely spoken indigenous languages in Latin America, but despite 
these large numbers, the actual number of speakers has been rapidly declining in the 2oth and 2lSt 
centuries. 
The Quechua and Maya movements vary in their relative strength and prominence within 
the international indigenous movement. The Peruvian Quechua movement has been notably 
absent from the story of indigenous activism. The relative absence of land rights issues due to the 
lack of currently valuable resources on Quechua land and a precedent for valuing class 
identification over race is largely attributed by Andeanist scholars for a lack of Quechua 
organization and mobilization (Degregori 2000; Skar 1982). By 1976, leftist President Juan 
Velasco Alvarado had redistributed 25 million acres of land from the rich landholders to the 
Quechua workers (Skar 1982: 5 1). Because of this land reform, in conjunction with Marxist 
attempts at promoting class identity over racial identity, the Quechua people of Peru have not 
used their indigenous identity for political mobilization. In contrast, the indigenous movement in 
Guatemala has been strong throughout the last decade. Language has been an important unifier 
for the movement because, despite differences between dialects, all are considered Mayan 
languages, and thus create a community of speakers. Language has become a political tool, and, 
working within the legal framework set up by the Guatemalan Constitution, the maintenance, 
revival, and expansion of Mayan languages play an important role in the demands of the Maya 
Movement (Fischer and McKenna 1996: 14). That Peru and Guatemala would each reach a point 
of institutional paralysis and symbolic support for multicultural policy despite such different 
processes makes some of the predictions drawn from nation-state formation theories individually 
problematic when using them to help explain nation-state transformation. 
For my comparative-historical analysis, I focus on the internal conflicts that took place in 
both countries in the second half of the twentieth century. These conflicts defined the context in 
which changes in state-indigenous relations occurred. This period of turmoil and violence in both 
countries is largely related to class and ethnic conflict during which civil wars between the state 
and guerrilla organizations marked history in both countries. Although here I call them internal 
conflicts, there was involvement by foreign governments (the U.S.) and by international human 
rights advocates. As a result, there may have been more going on to cause a shift than a top- 
down forced maintenance and legitimation of power by the states, as the bellicose and historical 
institutionalist theories might suggest. 
To address the questions about how the shift in state-indigenous relations influences 
language and education policies, I draw on two types of data. First, government reports, 
particularly those submitted to the United Nations Committee for the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination display states' representations of the logic of policy. Second, I conducted 
interviews in Peru and Guatemala with people working in the field of intercultural-bilingual 
education. The sample includes educators, government officials and indigenous activists. 
Interview questions concerned how these different actors approached intercultural-bilingual 
education, how they assessed these programs, and how they related to other actors in the field of 
indigenous rights and intercultural-bilingual education. I selected interview subjects by targeting 
government officials and indigenous organizations that have an international presence, and by 
using references from people in-country about other possible participants with on-the-ground 
experience. The goal of this sample is not to be representative, but to understand the experiences 
of different types of actors in the field of intercultural-bilingual education. 
Findings 
Shifts in state-indigenous relations occur when dynamics between states and citizens 
begin to change. We can better explain and measure these shifts through a more focused look at 
policy. As bureaucratic authorities, states use law to exert their authority over citizens, so 
accordingly law will be influenced by shifting relations. Although very similar outcomes of 
shifts from assimilation to symbolic support occurred in Peru and Guatemala, there are important 
differences to note. In Peru the government co-opted indigenous strategy during the internal 
conflict. In Guatemala the process of change was more two-sided, with negotiation and 
compromise, which characterizes the current policy situation. By observing these different 
trajectories we can see different ways of arriving at symbolic support. In accordance with the 
nation-state formation theories, governments were able to take advantage of shifting relations in 
order to gather leverage over rebel threats. Because of the prevalence of violence, however, this 
leverage had to be reached through "friendlier" tactics, resulting in symbolic support of 
multicultural policy. 
Peru: Co-optation and Faux Multiculturalism 
From the time of colonization through the 2oth century, the model for state-indigenous 
relations in Peru was violent assimilation. Since the arrival of Francisco Pizarro and his Spanish 
troops and the subsequent conquest of the Incan empire in 1532, racial mixing and forced 
assimilation into the dominant Spanish society were the most prominent themes in state- 
indigenous relations (Galeano 1973). By the twenty-first century, though, Peru had shifted to a 
policy of symbolic support, in which the political discourse supports multiculturalism while 
implementation remains inadequate. 
The point at which policy shifted can be traced to the internal conflict during the 1980s. 
In Peru this conflict took place between the Maoist Communist guerilla organization Sendero 
Luminoso (SL) and the government. Guerilla and government fighting largely occurred in the 
provinces of Junin and Ayacucho, areas with a high proportion of Quechua people (Kruijt 1999: 
33). SL became publicly violent in 1980, during the first democratic civilian elections after 
military dictatorship in the 1970s. SL's stated program included converting "backward" areas 
into bases of revolutionary support and using violence to conquer and expand this base of 
support (Palmer 1986: 129). Under this framework, SL wreaked havoc in the extremely 
impoverished area of Ayacucho until 1992, when several leading members were arrested. 
Because of the group's dependence on the charisma of its leaders, after the arrests SL became 
increasingly inactive throughout the 1990s (Kruijt 1999:42). 
Notwithstanding SL or government proclamations about goals to improve the lot of 
impoverished rural dwellers, the consequence of the internal conflict was the death of thousands 
of Quechua people at the hands of both the military and SL. In 1992 Quechua representatives 
presented a complaint to the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations (WGIP), 
illustrating the Quechua peoples' position in the middle of the war 
The indigenous peoples are the principal victims of this war, and 
are subject to permanent violation of their human rights. Of the 
23,000 civilians deaths from political violence and the 3000 
disappeared, the majority are Indians ... We state that the 
subversive groups and the Peruvian state are using the indigenous 
communities.. . violating the Geneva Conventions regarding the 
protection of the civilian population in the situations of war 
(Inforrne sobre la Situaci6n de 10s Derechos Humanos de 10s 
Pueblos Indigenas de Peru 1992).' 
Both the government and SL assumed the Quechua people to be allied with the other party. SL in 
particular used harsh strategies of humiliation and murder in an attempt to gamer support from 
the indigenous peoples (Kruijt 1999: 41). 
The government gains in the civil war, specifically the arrest of SL leaders, however, 
were possible because of the realization that indigenous people could be more useful to them 
alive than dead. Although government leaders suggested that social programs and economic 
development would help bring about the end of the conflict, these programs were never 
developed (Poole and Renique 1992: 8). Instead of social programs, economic development or a 
respect for human rights, government leaders turned to civilian defense patrols as the most 
successful strategy for bringing an end to the violence. In Peru these mandatory civilian defense 
patrols evolved as a result of similar voluntary organizations that were created in the highlands 
as a way for farmers to protect crops and livestock from guerilla fighters (Poole and Rknique 
1992: 68). Because of SL's violence toward highland peasants, it began to lose support. At the 
same time, the government saw the utility of the Rondas Campesinas and co-opted them to make 
them their own. While campesinos were given a government-mandated ability to protect 
themselves, the civilian defense patrols were also a way for the government to continue 
controlling the population. When they were first implemented civilians were expected to defend 
themselves with slings, sticks, knives and homemade rifles, but eventually President Fujimori 
(1990-2000) provided them with hunting rifles (Poole and Renique 1992: 69). He even went so 
far as to declare the mandatory civilian defense patrols the "semi-institutionalized fourth branch 
of the armed forces" (Kruijt 1999: 42). 
1 Unless otherwise noted, I translated all material from Spanish. 
By co-opting the indigenous defense patrols, the government was able to take advantage 
of this large population that they had been trying so hard to assimilate for hundreds of years. 
With the indigenous population on their side, the government would have much more support 
throughout the country. It is evident that this shift was also realized from the perspective of the 
Quechua, who banded together to express grievances to the United Nations in 1992, an 
unprecedented event in Peru. They saw an opportunity to express their voice, in the hopes that 
the government would listen. 
Guatemala: Contention, Negotiation and Compromise 
Guatemala's history is similar to Peru's in that descendants of the once powerful Mayan 
empire also experienced its destruction and colonization at the hands of the Spanish empire. 
Hernan Cortks arrived in 1519 and shortly after the Mayan empire, already largely under the 
influence of the Aztec empire, fell apart completely (Chasteen 2001). Mestizaje, the concept of 
mixed races, is prevalent in Guatemala in the same way that it is in Peru. Until the -global 
indigenous movement became more powerhl, the Guatemalan state was able to conduct its 
agenda of assimilation with little problem, but it had to adjust strategies to conform to 
international expectations, as well as to maintain control of the population. 
Like Peru, state-indigenous relations seem to have changed in Guatemala during its 
internal conflict. In a similar turn of events, the government only began to be victorious against 
the guerilla organizations when it began to use the indigenous people through mandatory civilian 
defense patrols. Before the peace accords, signed in 1996, guerrilla violence had been a constant 
presence in Guatemala since the 1960s. During the most violent period of the internal violence, 
the 1980s, the Mayan people found themselves caught in the middle. Early guerilla fighters came 
from the ousted political regime of President Jacobo Arbenz (1 95 1-1 954), who was forcefully 
removed from office with the assistance of the United States because of his "socialist" politics, 
including a land reform which interfered with the business of the US company, the United Fruit 
Company (Jonas 2000). Though this period of insurgency was put down by the army with little 
trouble, the legacy of guerilla violence influenced the state's increasingly violent reactions to the 
resurgence of guerilla fighters in the 1980s (Kruijt 1999). 
The reappearance of a guerilla movement in the 1980s was largely due to economic and 
social factors which led to difficult living conditions for the poor, both indigenous and ladino. 
Guerilla organizations grew from labor movements of the 1970s, involving indigenous and 
ladino, from the city and the country, because of such universally poor working conditions (Sigel 
and Yates 1983). The two guerilla organizations to emerge in the early 1980s, EGP (akrcito 
Guerrillero de 10s Pobres) and ORPA (Organizacidn del Pueblo en Armas), garnered support 
from indigenous peoples living in the highlands, unlike the largely ladino guerillas of the 1960s 
(Jonas 2000: 21). This indigenous support also differs from the support of SL in Peru, since 
indigenous involvement in Guatemala was higher than in Peru (Kruijt 1999). 
Guatemala's response to the insurgency of the 1980s consisted of "intimidation, attack, 
violence, torture and blind destruction" (Kruij t 1999: 47). Between 1980 and 1985, 
approximately 100,000 civilians were killed due to the army's "scorched earth" policy; 450 
villages and hamlets were completely destroyed; 500,000 campesinos migrated abroad; and 
several thousands were disappeared (Kruijt 1999: 49). After this period of extreme violence, 
often considered genocide, the URNG (Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guaternalteca), a 
consolidation of the EGP and ORPS, seemed to be defeated. 
The URNG reemerged in the late 1980s, but with a different strategy. Guerilla leaders 
understood that the suffering and death toll had been too great on the civilian populations during 
the first wave of violence; therefore they looked to a strategy of negotiation to reach a 
compromise with the government which became feasible only after a transition back to 
democracy and civilian rule after the 1986 elections. By 1990 it had become apparent to both 
sides that the war could not be won by either of them, and after much negotiation they were able 
to reach a peace agreement, which was signed in 1996 (Jonas 2000). The most important piece of 
the accords in terms of indigenous rights is the Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
Accord, which contains provisions for overcoming the years of discrimination and 
marginalization, allowing indigenous peoples to be protected through education, as well as 
making discrimination against the law (Jonas 2000: 75). 
As in Peru, when the government began to use civilian defense patrols, they began to 
succeed in putting down guerilla violence. After the intense violence of 1980-1982 as a means 
to wipe out civilian support for guerillas, the government decided to try a different tactic for 
controlling the possible guerilla sympathizers. General Hector Gramajo, in a 1990 interview, 
reportedly said, "Rather than killing 100' per cent, we provided food for 70 per cent [of war 
refugees] while killing 30 per cent" (Kruijt 51). In exchange for participating in the civilian 
defense patrols, villages received food and infrastructure, while the alternative to participating 
was death. An important difference, however, is that there is no direct co-optation in this story. 
The civilian defense patrols were mandated by the government first, with no precedent of 
campesino organization. The indigenous people found themselves forced into the middle of the 
internal conflict, forced to declare loyalty to a side (Eckhardt 2006: 33). Society became 
militarized, and the side which could win support from the majority of the Maya people would 
win. At this point both sides of the war de-escalated their use of violence, as the tug-of-war 
opened the possibility for expression of an indigenous voice. 
Since the peace accords of 1996, physical violence toward indigenous groups in 
Guatemala has declined, but the government continues to practice a kind of symbolic violence 
by continuing to exclude them from society, while declaring to support their inclusion in the 
national identity. The Maya Movement emerged in visible strength only after the peace accords. 
It began expressing grievances as Mayans rather than campesinos. At this point in time, 
indigenous identity had become a useful tool in the international political sphere. By listening to 
this voice, even if only a little bit, the government was able to gain favor, decreasing support for 
any challengers. 
The notable differences of these two stories help explain the pictures of policy 
implementation that we see today. In Peru, the organization created by the indigenous groups 
themselves was co-opted by the government. There was little direct negotiation with the 
government, and the internal conflict ended by and large when SL leaders were arrested, not in a 
series of negotiated peace accords. In Guatemala, however, there was more negotiation and 
compromise with the government. The process was much more two-sided than in Peru, opening 
up a political opportunity structure for the Maya Movement. The two-way process of change 
diverges from many nation-state formation theories, which describe a top-down restructuring. 
Though the processes in Peru and Guatemala were different, we see contention in both cases, 
indicating a more interactive process of change. Keeping these differences in mind, we can look 
at how the shifts in relations that occurred with the end of internal conflict have influenced 
changes in policy, by looking directly at implementation of intercultural-bilingual education. 
Intercultural-Bilingual Education in Peru and Guatemala 
The civilian defense patrols helped to bring about the end of the armed conflict, even if 
all of the actions of the civilian defense patrols were not always in the best interest of the people. 
The "voluntary" nature of the patrols gives the illusion of civilian participation. Because the 
governments viewed the guerilla organizations as largely ethnic insurgencies, the patrols became 
a way to control ethnic groups and stay any possible ethnic movements. By making laws that 
protect indigenous rights, the state could claim compassion for indigenous groups, without 
needing to provide realistic means for carrying out the laws. The implementation of mandatory 
communal defense patrols in Peru and Guatemala is not only a turning point in the context of the 
internal conflicts of both countries, but also in the context of state-indigenous relations. Up until 
this point, governments had supported policies of assimilation and castellanizacibn through 
education. Bilingual education was originally a means to give indigenous people a better 
opportunity to learn Spanish. At this turning point in the civil war, the mindset of the 
government moved from assimilation to integration. The discontinuation of intercultural- 
bilingual education programs after only a few years of schooling displays this shift. The 
programs as they currently are may help with the more general issue of illiteracy by giving 
indigenous children more educational opportunities, but they nevertheless contribute to 
castellanizacidn. 
Peru and Guatemala have both seen some sort of bilingual education since the 1960s and 
1970s, but the programs have progressed and changed since their origins, largely due to the 
social context in which they have been experienced by indigenous citizens. In Guatemala, the 
campaign for intercultural-bilingual education has gained strength as a piece of the agenda of the 
Maya Movement. In contrast, due to the lack of concrete organization by Quechua groups, many 
of the demands for education reform in Peru have come from activists and external 
organizations, concerned with the situation of human rights there. Though the programs have 
formed and developed under different circumstances, both countries currently experience a state 
of institutional paralysis with regard to their education programs. 
In Peru, the first bilingual education reform came with a wide-ranging education reform 
in 1972 and 1973. At this time, the programs were understood as only bilingual, the word 
intercultural still absent. These reforms meant that non-Spanish speaking people would learn two 
languages, Spanish and their maternal language, and Spanish-speakers would continue learning 
only Spanish (Hornberger 2000). Quechua went from being a national language in 1975, to being 
a language "in official use in the zones and forms established by the law" after a speedy 
demotion (Freeland 1996: 8). The goal of the programs of the 1970s was for the indigenous 
person to first learn in his or her maternal language in order to then learn Spanish better, thereby 
improving his or her living conditions and social status (Zufiiga and Galvez 2002). At this point 
assimilation was still the end goal. 
In the 1990s, the policy moved toward generalization of the bilingual education programs 
as a way to "look for unity in diversity" (Zuiiiga and Galvez 2002: 14). The programs, ideally if 
not in actual practice, were meant to be for everyone, indigenous or ladino, so as to create a 
respect for the diversity of the country. Though this trend has continued, in reality intercultural- 
bilingual education only reaches 10% of the schools in indigenous areas and is only present in 
primary schools in rural areas (Zufiiga and Galvez 2002: 16). Progress has been made, but, due 
to opposition for many years from indigenous people themselves, pressure on the government 
has largely come from international organizations. Maria Elena Garcia's study of rural bilingual 
education demonstrates how Quechua parents did not want their children learning Quechua in 
school because, due to years of discrimination, they believed Spanish would be more useful to 
their children (Garcia 2003). Although the activists and teachers I spoke with are all Peruvian, all 
are mestizo (mixed race) and from the city. 
Education reform began earlier in Guatemala. In the 1960s, programs were being 
developed first for speakers of Maya Ixil, and later for K'iche, Kaqchikel, Q'eqchi and Mam, the 
most commonly spoken Mayan languages (DIGEBI 2009). At this time, the programs were 
called Programas de Castellanizaci6n, meaning that the goal was assimilation, rather than 
preservation or valorization of indigenous languages. The 1965 constitution declared Spanish the 
official language and went as far as to say that it was the state's responsibility to integrate 
indigenous peoples into the national culture (Becker Richards and Richards 1996: 2 10). 
In 1985, in the midst of widespread state and guerilla violence, the Proyecto Nacional de 
Educacidn Bilingiie Intercultural (PRONEBI) was made an official part of the Ministry of 
Education. As a concession by the government, it acted with relative autonomy, but lacked 
support from the government and the Ministry (Becker Richards and Richards 1996). In 1995 
PRONEBI became La Direcci6n General de Educacidn Bilingiie Intercultural (DIGEBI) and 
under law is a permanent institution of the government (DIGEBI 2009). These departments are 
important because they are largely run "for Indians by Indians" (Becker Richards and Richards 
1996: 214), but still must operate within government rules and with monetary support from the 
government, which has proved insufficient. 
Despite these slightly different trajectories, from an outside perspective the institutional 
paralysis appears to be the same in both countries. Reports from the United Nations Committee 
to Eliminate Racial Discrimination (CERD) exemplify this perspective. The documents include 
reports from the government (in both cases, these reports were submitted significantly behind 
schedule) on how they are providing for the elimination of racism, as well as reports from the 
Committee and from indigenous groups, which critique the government's efforts. 
Reports from the Committee note that while the governments made laws to eliminate 
discrimination, these laws have no provisions for their function in the real world. They are grand 
statements, rather than effective measures toward the elimination of racism. The report from the 
government of Peru contains many such statements, including provisions for intercultural- 
bilingual education. 
The EIB (educacidn intercultural-bilingiie) develops its job 
considering the right of indigenous peoples and rural 
communities to educate themselves in their own language and 
culture. Meaning, learn their language and in their language, in 
addition to Spanish as a second language, achieving in this a 
cultural education (Government of Peru 2009: 47). 
Despite these declarations, the CERD response expresses some uncertainty. "The Committee 
remains concerned that a high proportion of persons among the indigenous peoples continue to 
suffer in practice from racism and structural racial discrimination in the State party" (CERD 
2009: 2). CERD seems to be aware of the nominal and symbolic support that the state is giving 
to indigenous rights, and suggests more thorough provisions, recommending that, "the State 
party find out why the use of indigenous languages has declined ... and the speedy adoption of the 
bill on the preservation and use of the native languages of Peru" (CERD 2009: 4). 
CERD reports in Guatemala display a similar situation to that in Peru. While reports by 
the country to CERD provide long lists of laws that have been set up to ensure equality, 
indigenous activists argue that "they are good will declarations that are not accompanied by 
operative plans that allow their real implementation" (Organization of Indigenous Groups 
Guatemala 2010: 7). The laws lack practical provisions for carrying them out. 
In contrast to Peru, however, in the state report by Guatemala to CERD, state 
representatives are more honest in admitting their actual priorities. "We are therefore bound to 
admit that, with some exceptions, matters relating to indigenous peoples and other human rights 
issues regrettably do not figure prominently in those agendas" (Government of Guatemala 2007: 
3). This confession gives us a picture of the symbolic nature of the laws. Though their existence 
could be considered an important move forward, as one interviewee did comment, the 
enforcement of the laws is clearly not the top priority of the state. As of 2010, in Guatemala only 
4% of the recommendations by the state have been fulfilled, which includes the adoption of two 
instruments: the ILO Convention 169 and the National Policy against Racism, two symbolic 
decrees (Organization of Indigenous Peoples Guatemala 20 10: 6). 
Keeping these international reactions to policy changes in mind, it is useful to now 
consider the personal perspective of people involved with intercultural-bilingual education. 
These interviews not only build on this establishment of an institutional paralysis, but they offer 
insight into how the implementation is perceived by varying actors within the field. Interview 
data from government officials, indigenous activists and teachers in the two countries 
demonstrated that all responded in similar ways regarding the state of bilingual education in Peru 
and Guatemala. Despite some differences, it is the similarities that make the cases important and 
of interest. These similarities are surprising in light of the difference in the trajectories of change 
in the two countries and variation in the relative importance of language to the movements in the 
countries. 
A key theme across responses was the way in which government had changed its 
discourse, but not really its implementation of policy, exemplified by the name change (bilingual 
to intercultural-bilingual). To one activist, this change in itself is a positive step forward. "Well, 
maybe the change from there being nothing to there being something, for us that is already a 
success." However, even a government official admitted that this change had been ineffective. 
"There are few schools. First, second maybe third grade, but not more than that. Because there is 
not much support [from the government] for bilingual education." Another activist commented, 
"There are declarations of desire and declarations of reality." As observed in the CERD reports, 
the governments are very good at making these declarations of desire, but need improvement in 
their declarations of reality. 
The goals of intercultural-bilingual education programs are very generally to instill in the 
next generation a respect for all cultures, and especially a respect for the multicultural nature of 
Guatemala and Peru. It is because of these more recently defined goals that the programs are 
now called intercultural-bilingual education programs. The intercultural element has become 
increasingly important in light of the continued discrimination toward indigenous peoples. An 
activist explained, "there are social goals that there be no marginalization, that there be no 
discrimination. We want that: a country without discrimination." A government official's 
perspective was similar. "Relations between the cultures are not very good ... so there is a 
necessity to build respect, tolerance, dialogue, understanding." While different agents seem to 
understand the main goals of intercultural-bilingual education, their strategies for carrying out 
these goals continue to be different. This declaration of desire from the government official 
demonstrates the discourse, without the implementation. 
Because of this lack of real, concrete support from the government, those involved are 
able to point out many problems that must be solved in order for the programs to be successful. 
These problems include, but are not limited to, a lack of government funding, insufficient teacher 
training, continued discrimination toward speakers of indigenous languages, and the 
discontinuation of intercultural-bilingual education after the third year of primary school. 
Overwhelmingly, subjects responded that if more money was channeled toward education in 
general, and especially intercultural-bilingual education, the goals of this type of education 
would be met more easily. An indigenous activist said, "There can have been intentions to do 
bilingual education in the country, but what there has not been is the will to give economic 
support to perform bilingual education." What money the government does have has not been 
channeled toward intercultural-bilingual education programs. 
While the governments are aware of the need and desire for money, officials state that 
there is no more money to go toward education. A government official said, "The few resources 
that there are ...g o to other areas. Defense, police." An indigenous activist in Guatemala informed 
me that from the national budget, about 2% goes to education and about 5% of that 2% goes 
toward intercultural-bilingual education. "5% is almost nothing ... for the demand that there is: to 
train teachers, make materials, carry out various processes." There is a feeling of a lack of 
tangible support from the government. 
With so little money provided by the government, NGOs and schools are not able to 
reach all of the areas that they want to, and as a consequence many schools and regions are 
neglected. In Guatemala, because there are 22 different Mayan languages, not all of the 
languages get the attention that they need. Similarly in Peru, Quechua language texts are being 
sent to Amazonian communities, where Quechua is not spoken as the maternal language. 
Another consequence that may stem from lack of funds or other government inefficiencies is that 
the programs only last up until about the third year of primary education. After this, students 
learn only in Spanish and consequently much of the work they did to learn indigenous languages 
in the first few years of school is lost quickly in favor of Spanish. An activist commented, 
What happens is that when they pass onto fourth, fifth and sixth 
grade, now the little boy or the little girl does not want to talk in the 
maternal language.. .there is psychological breaking.. .and it makes 
it so that they do not want to talk of their culture or their language. 
Children become integrated into Spanish-speaking society, which surrounds them. 
Both official documentation from the United Nations and personal stories indicate a 
situation of institutional paralysis in Peru and Guatemala. State co-optation in Peru could be 
viewed as more in-line with theories critical of multiculturalism, because of its seemingly top- 
down and faux nature. In Guatemala, the process has been more contentious, with the 
government compromising and negotiating with indigenous groups. Although the process has 
been slightly different, the implementation gap is the same in both countries, suggesting that the 
gap comes not from the motivations for policy but how these policies intersect with bureaucracy. 
This shift from assimilation to symbolic support can be observed in both countries, and 
explained through historical context, official documents and personal accounts. 
Conclusions 
In Peru and Guatemala shifts in state-indigenous relations were motivated by internal 
threats to governmental authority. By transitioning from assimilation to symbolic support, states 
were able to win support from marginalized groups and maintain their bureaucratic authority. 
Though the specific details of this transition differ in Guatemala and Peru, these differences can 
be attributed to the relative strength of each indigenous movement. In Guatemala, an organized 
indigenous movement, in conjunction with an indigenous-backed guerilla insurgence resulted in 
negotiation with the government. In Peru, strategies of a weaker indigenous movement were co- 
opted by the government. Despite these differences, we can see the importance of domestic 
contention in causing policy shifts, in accordance with cultural community and historical 
institutionalist theories. In contrast to bellicose and world polity theory, however, international 
pressure or influence is less apparent. Neither country felt compelled to announce the shift on an 
international level, made evident by their late submission of reports to the Convention for the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination, though they had in fact transitioned from assimilation to 
symbolic support well before their eventual submission. 
Though the influence of global norms and culture predicted by world polity theory does 
not seem apparent in these cases, the outcome predicted by world polity theory, decoupling, is 
apparent in both cases. The examples of Peru and Guatemala highlight the weaknesses of 
bureaucratic authority, because legal change has not led to any real resources or implementation. 
Bureaucratic authority puts the power for change in the hands of the government. While 
individuals or groups can petition the government for change, once taken up by the government 
it leaves their control to a certain extent. It is up to the government to implement policy change, 
and in the cases of Peru and Guatemala we can see how governments are able to avoid 
implementation by blaming a lack of resources, which is presumably beyond their control. In 
Peru and Guatemala the source of this problem may come more from the underrepresentation of 
indigenous groups in the government. If there were more people supporting the interests of the 
more marginalized groups, like the Quechua and the Maya, then maybe we would see more 
progressive change in their favor. However, this more complete representation of the citizenry 
may be exactly what those in power do not want, 
The movement toward integration instead of pluralism makes sense because of the 
importance of law in making change in contemporary nation-states. Law generally reflects the 
dominant social and political group, so if non-dominant groups are allowed to have more 
influence on the dominant group, the interests of the dominant group may be challenged. 
Additionally, because nation-states depend so heavily on a cohesive national identity, pluralism 
might complicate this identity, causing a division of power. Because of this division of power, 
we may even see a breakdown of the bureaucratic authority. Integration, then, is better for a state 
hoping to maintain its bureaucratic authority. The state is able to express a change to more 
multicultural policy through discourse rather than action, allowing them to stay non-dominant 
ethnic groups and protect their own interests. 
Despite these outcomes, the adoption and implementation of multiculturalism is, in fact, 
an interactive process, not merely a top-down restructuring. The calls for change from the 
indigenous peoples themselves were integral in creating change for it seems that without this 
states would not have felt the pressure for a shift in policy. Perhaps because of the interactive 
nature of it, change is more limited in already formed nation-states than it was for yet-to-be- 
formed nation-states. Change in nation-states is legally based, which causes stronger barriers to 
reform. If bureaucratic authority creates opportunities for implementation gaps, then political 
gains won through contentious processes could be severely limited, and become symbolic rather 
than progressive. Under these conditions, declarations of desire will abound and declarations of 
reality will remain scarce. 
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